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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ON THE CROSS-APPEAL
Inasmuch as the Utah Supreme Court has transferred the case, this Court has
original jurisdiction over this cross-appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996).
CONTROLLING STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following court rule is of central importance to the cross-appeal is set out
verbatim herein:
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable
nelgect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a)
of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte
unless the tiral court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of
practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs
later.
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I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL
I. Nature of the Case

<

This case involves a personal injury dispute arising out of an automobile accident
in which the Serratos' verhicle collided with a negligently operated Utah Transit
i

Authority (hereinafter "UTA") bus. The Serratos subsequently filed a complaint in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. The propriety of the notices of claim
filed with the UTA were challenged, and the Serratos' claims were dismissed. The
Trial Court later granted the Serratos additional time to file their Notice of Appealwhich ruling is the subject of this cross-appeal.
II. Course of Proceedings
After the Serratos commenced their litigation in the Third District Court, the
UTA and the Serratos filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following a
hearing, the Trial Court granted the UTA's motion for summary judgment, concluding
that the Serratos' failure to properly file the notice of claim with the UTA's Board of
Directors barred the Serratos' court claims.
The Trial Court entered the Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal on
August 26, 1999. Subsequently, on October 1, 1999, the Serratos filed a motion to
extend the time to appeal in accordance with Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedures. The motion was opposed by the UTA. Following full briefing by the
parties, and the filing of affidavits, the Trial Court granted the Serratos' Rule 4(e)
2

^
<

motion by minute entry dated October 27, 1999, and entered a formal order extending
the time to appeal on November 8, 1999.
The Serratos filed their Notice of Appeal on November 2, 1999, and the UTA
filed a notice of cross-appeal on November 15, 1999.
III. Statement of Facts Relevant to Cross-Appeal
On or about August 2, 1999, the Court held a hearing on plaintiffs' and
defendants Motion and Cross-motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 316) On or about
August 11, 1999, the Serratos' counsel received a proposed Summary Judgment and
Order of Dismissal prepared by the UTA. (R. 251, 260) The Serratos' counsel had no
objection to the form of the proposed Order.
The Serratos' counsel first learned that their Motion for Summary Judgment was
denied and the UTA's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on August 19, 1999,
following a telephone call to the Court Clerk. (R. 255) Plaintiffs' counsel was
informed at that time that the Order had not yet been signed and was not yet entered.
The Serratos' counsel began to make preparations to file a Notice of Appeal
immediately. (R. 259)
On August 23, 1999, the Serratos' counsel received a copy of a cover letter
prepared by the UTA's counsel addressed to the trial court stating that they were
forwarding "a proposed form of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal, for [the

3

Court's] review and signature." (R. 264) The UTA requested that the trial court sign
the Order and enter it with the Court Clerk.

'

On or about September 1, 1999, the Serratos' counsel received a "Notice of
Entry of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal" prepared and served by the

^

UTA's counsel. (R. 253, 290) This document, dated August 31, 1999, stated that the
Order was signed by this Court on August 26, 1999. (R. 252) The notice made no
i

mention of when the Order was actually entered.

**"

The Serratos' counsel never received any notice from the Court Clerk or any

1

other party that a judgment was entered. (R. 255)
The Serratos' counsel, however, misread the notice and believed that August 31,
1999, was the date that judgment was entered. (R. 290) Plaintiffs' counsel accordingly
calendared September 30, 1999, as the final date when a Notice of Appeal could be
filed. (R. 290)
On or about September 2, 1999, Serratos' counsel prepared a draft Notice of
Appeal which he intended to file. This Notice of Appeal was not filed on September 2,
1999 as appellate co-counsel was out of town. (R. 290)
The Serratos' counsel was fully prepared to file the Notice of Appeal on
September 30, 1999, until a phone call to the Court Clerk informed the Serratos'
counsel that judgment was entered on August 20, 1999 and not August 31, 1999. (R.

4

,

290-91) As it turns out, the clerk's communication was also erroneous. The Order
was in fact entered on August 26th.
The Serratos' Notice of Appeal should have been filed on Monday, September
27, 1999. The Serratos filed a motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
the very next day, October 1, 1999. (R. 254)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
The Trial Court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a Rule 4(e)
motion to extend the time to appeal, and an appellate court will not reverse the Trial
Court's determination unless the lower court's decision was beyond the limits of
reasonability. The Trial Court in this case properly found excusable neglect on the part
of the Serratos' counsel after considering the factors articulated in the Utah Supreme
Court decision in West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 347 (Utah 1997). Those factors
include 1) potential prejudice to opposing party; 2) the length of the delay and its
potential impact on judicial proceedings; 4) the reason for delay (including whether or
not it was within the control of the moving party); 5) whether the moving party acted in
good faith. Moreover, the UTA's reliance on Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supp. Co, 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984) is outdated and misplaced. The Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in granting the Serratos1 Rule 4(e) motion in this case.

5

i
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
I. The Trial Court Has Broad Discretion With Regard to Rule 4(e) Motions.

i

Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in part that "[t]he
trial court, upon a showing of excusable nelgect or good cause, may extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal." Trial courts have "broad discretion in granting or denying"

a

Rule 4(e) motions to extend the time to appeal. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337,
i

340 (Utah 1997). This is because questions related to whether "any given set of facts
constitutes 'excusable neglect' [or good cause] under appellate rule 4(e) is highly fact —
dependent," and no rule adequately addressing all potential situations and relevant
factors can be spelled out by appellate courts. IdL at 339-40.
Accordingly, the Trial Court's decision granting the Serratos additional time to
file their notice of appeal will be reversed only if the Trial Court abused its discretion.
See kL; Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supp. Co, 676 P.2d 952, 959 (Utah 1984).
Moreover, this Court has previously asserted that it "will only conclude the trial court
abused its discretion if the ruling was 'beyond the limits of reasonability.'" Tolman v.
Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah App. 1996).
II. The Trial Court Properly Granted the Serratos1 Rule 4(e) Motion.
A. The Prowswood case and other cases cited by the UTA are not controlling.
Certainly, in light of the factors enumerated in the West case, the Trial Court's
decision to grant the Serratos' Rule 4(e) motion was well within the "limits of
6
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reasonability." On the other hand, the UTA would have this Court dramatically reduce
the "broad discretion" enjoyed by Utah's trial courts in addressing Rule 4(e) motions.
Wholly ignoring the most recent Utah Supreme Court declarations concerning
Appellate Rule 4(e), the UTA relies upon Prowswood and federal cases to limit the
granting of extensions in such cases to only the most unique and extraordinary
circumstances. This is not the rule in Utah.
Indeed, the UTAfs extensive reliance upon the controversial Prowswood case is
misplaced for several reasons. For one, the three-to-two majority opinion in
Prowswood was based upon a prior rule. See Prowswood. 676 P.2d at 959. Since the
Prowswood decision, Rule 4(e) has been implemented, adding "good cause" to
"excusable neglect" as an alternative basis for granting an extension of time to file a
notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(e). Certainly the addition of "good cause"
had the effect of softening or ameliorating Prowswood*s seemingly draconian effect.
The Utah Supreme Court recently declared that '[t]he plain meaning of Utah's rule 4(e)
is that 'good cause' is not limited and is an appropriate ground for granting a rule 4(e)
extension after the initial thirty-day period." Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491, 494
(Utah 1996) (declining to follow the majority rule in federal courts).
More importantly, the Prowswood ruling has been at least implicitly modified by
the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in the West case. 942 P.2d 337. In fact, the

7
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Prowswood decision was not relied upon, nor even cited, by the Supreme Court in
West.

i
In determining whether a party has shown "excusable neglect" for failure to

timely file a Notice of Appeal, the Court should make a broad equitable inquiry,
balancing the interests of the parties with policies involved. The questions of whether
attorney neglect is excusable is an equitable one, and such a determination should take ^„
i

into account all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's neglect. West v. Grand
County. 942 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah, 1997) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick
Assoc,, 507 U.S. 380 (1993)).

'

B. The West case outlines the relevant factors for a trial court to consider with
regard to Rule 4(e) motions.
In 1997, the Utah Supreme Court articulated the factors to be considered: 1)
potential prejudice to opposing party; 2) the length of the delay and its potential impact
on judicial proceedings; 4) the reason for delay (including whether or not it was within
the control of the moving party); 5) whether die moving party acted in good faith.
West. 942 P.2d at 340-41. While these factors are not dispositive in determining
whether or not there was excusable neglect, they are helpful in determining the equities
and whether or not a finding of excusable neglect is warranted. IcL at 340-341. This is
the most recent articulatin of the "excusable neglect" standard and is the law on this
subject in the state of Utah.

8

It is interesting to note the factors that were not articulated: The Utah Supreme
Court did not list "experience of counsel" as a factor to be considered. Nor did it list
knowledge of the courts intention to grant a motion for summary judgment as a factor.
Nor was notice of a minute entry a factor to be considered. In fact, notice regarding
the Court's ruling is not at all relevant in evaluating the equities at stake here. These
are the arguments the UTA has manufactured to attack the Trial Court's decision.
According to the Utah Supreme Court, however, these are not relevant facts to be
considered in an analysis to determine whether there has been excusable neglect.
In addition, the West Court did not state that the factual circumstances had to be
"unique" or "extraordinary" as the UTA has suggested. Case law construing the
"unique or extraordinary" test was cited in the earlier case of Prows wood. However,
neither Prowswood nor any of the federal cases cited by the UTA on appeal are even
cited and relied upon in the more recent case of West. The Utah Supreme Court did
not discuss or adopt this harsh standard despite the fact that the West case involved the
precise issue presented here: failure to timely file a Notice of Appeal due to attorney's
excusable neglect in correctly discerning the date of entry of judgment.
The Court in West was not willing to foreclose the possibility of afindingof
excusable neglect concerning facts much more egregious than those presented here. In
West, plaintiff's counsel did not learn of the entry of judgment and failed to check
periodically with the court clerk as to the status of the judgment resulting in a delay of
9

i
nearly two months before a Rule 4(e) motion was filed. West, 942 P.2d at 338-39.
Even so, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of that motion and

i

remanded the case. Id. at 341.
In this case there was no such lack of diligence on the part of the Serratos'
counsel. Instead, counsel relied on an erroneous interpretation of the "Notice of Entry ^
of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal." When a call was made to the court

*•

:,
i

clerk on September 30, 1999, counsel learned for the first time that judgment had not been entered on August 31, 1999, and was informed that judgment had been entered on
August 20, 1999 (which was, ironically, also incorrect information).
Application of the relevant factors from the West case to the facts in this case
certainly supports the trial court's ruling granting the Serratos' Rule 4(e) motion. The
actual delay was short. Judgment was entered by the clerk on August 26, 1999, and
the Serratos' Notice of Appeal was due on Monday, September 27, 1999. The
Serratos' counsel miscalendared the deadline for September 30, 1999, and only realized
his mistake on the same day. Therefore, only four days elapsed between the actual
deadline for filing the Notice of Appeal and the filing of the Rule 4(e) motion.
In addition, UTA failed to articulate to the Trial Court or this Court any
potential prejudice it may have suffered because of the delay. The passage of these
four days did not cause defendant any prejudice.

10
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Certainly, the delay is so short it will have no impact on judicial proceedings. In
the West case, the Court found that it was possible for there to be excusable neglect
even in the case of a two-month delay.
The reason for the delay is clearly a mistake on the part of Serratos1 counsel in
misreading the "Notice of Entry of Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal" and
believing that the operative date was August 31, 1999, rather than August 26, 1999.
Even so, the language of the Notice states that the order was signed on August 26,
1999, but the document does not state that the order was entered by the clerk on August
26, 1999. It was resonable for the Serratos' counsel and his staff to believe that the
order was not entered the same day it was signed. See Washington Federal Sav. and
Loan Ass'n. v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. 865 P.2d 1004 (Idaho App. 1993)
(holding that "excusable neglect" requires an inquiry into whether the conduct alleged
was excusable because a reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing
under the same circumstances). It was also reasonable to believe that the Order was
entered on the day of the Notice of Entry of Judgment was signed. Soon after receipt
of the Notice, the entire file was sent to another attorney's office and Serratos' counsel
did not have the opportunity to double check and correct his calendaring error.
Unfortunately, the Serratos' counsel relied on the initial misinterpretation of the date
judgment was entered and had no reason or to believe that the date calendared was
erroneous. In any event, the concept of neglect is not limited to the situations beyond
11

i
the control of a party. In re Springfield Contracting Corp. Bkrtcy.. 156 B.R. 761
(E.D. Virginia, 1993).

i

The final factor relevant to this analysis is whether the Serratos1 counsel acted in
good faith. There are no facts asserted by any party that suggest the Serratos' counsel
did not act in good faith. The neglect by the Serratos' counsel surely did not give the &-

-

Serratos any unfair advantage, nor was there any other incentive for delaying the filing
of the Notice of Appeal. The Serratos and their counsel always had the intent to, and
were otherwise prepared to, timely file the Notice of Appeal, but they were waiting to
confer with appellate counsel to ensure that the Notice was properly worded. The
Serratos' counsel honestly believed that the date judgment was entered was August 31,
1999. This mistake by counsel does not suggest or imply any bad faith.
Several factually similar cases support a finding of excusable neglect or good
cause in this case. See, e.g.. United States v. Brown, 133 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 1998)
(wherein counsel filed the notice of appeal one day late under the mistaken belief that
weekends and holidays tolled the applicable time period); Blissett v. Casey, 969 F.
Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (wherein attorney miscalculated date for filing and service,
but delay was only ten days); Natural Father v. Tolbert, 170 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324 (U.S. Kan. 1993).
After analysis of this factual scenario under the guidelines dictated by the Utah
Supreme Court, it is overwhelmingly evident that there has been excusable neglect in
12
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this case. In addition, or in the alternative, the facts demonstrate "good cause" for
allowing the time to be extended. See Ottesonv. State. 945 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah App.
1997) (indicating that an appellate court "may affirm trial court decisions on any proper
grounds").
The Trial Court agreed with the Serratos and granted an extension of time to file
the Notice of Appeal. The Trial Court's decision was well within the scope of its
discretion, and was by no means "beyond the limits of reasonability."
CONCLUSION ON CROSS-APPEAL
On the basis of the foregoing arguments and analysis, this Court should affirm
the Trial Court's decision granting the Serratos additional time to file their Notice of
Appeal.
ARGUMENT OF REPLY BRIEF
I. Utah Appellate Courts Have Made Exceptions to the General Rule
of Strict Compliance with Regard to Notice of Claim Filings.
Not surprisingly, the UTA asserts that any notice of claim not actually served on
the UTA's Board of Directors is inadequate and fails to strictly comply with section 6330-13 of the Utah Code, as that statute existed at the time the notice was presented in
this case. While the Serratos admit that they did not actually serve the notice of claim
upon the UTA's Board of Directors, they strongly assert that serving the notice of

13

claim on the UTA's Risk Manager and Claims Administrator satisfied the statutory
requirements for filing a notice of claim with a political subdivision of the State.
The UTA would have this Court conclude that absent "strict compliance" with
the notice of claim provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, a Plaintiffs claims
must be barred. Nevertheless, exceptions to this rule have been made and justified by
Utah's appellate courts. Indeed, the UTA glosses over the principles established in the
Larson and Bischel cases, suggesting that those cases have little or no precedential
value. See Larson v.Park City Mun.Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998); Bischel v.
Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995). Both of those cases validated a notice of
claim filed upon someone other than the "governing body" of the respective political
subdivisions involved. While both of those prior cases turned upon unique factual ...
scenarios, this case also involves a unique set of facts that justify the Serratos'
determination of how to serve a notice of claim upon the UTA.
Moreover, the UTA repeatedly cites cases for the proposition that "actual
notice" does not satisfy the requirement that a notice of claim be filed. The Serratos do
not dispute this proposition. Nevertheless, a notice of claim was filed in this case,
albeit not with the actual UTA Board of Directors. The Serratos have never relied
upon an "actual notice" argument to justify their actions; accordingly, the UTA's strong
reliance upon such cases is misplaced.

14

II. The Notice of Claim Statutes Do Not Identify the Board of Directors as
the Governing Body of the UTA, Nor Do They Identify How to Serve the Board.
While the UTA presumptively concludes that "it is not difficult to identify and
serve a notice of claim on the UTA's governing body," see Appellee's Brief at 14, the
Serratos vehemently disagree. The Utah Supreme Court would seem to agree, having
previously expressed concern that, "[u]nfortunately, the term 'governing body' is not
defined within the Act itself," and expressing further concerns that none of the statutes
stated how or in what manner a notice of claim should be filed with the governing body
in that case. Larson, 955 P.2d at 345. See also BischeL 907 P.2d at 278 (wherein the
Court of Appeals was similarly concerned that "the statute is generally silent about how
notice should be filed with the governing body").
In fact nowhere is the term "governing body" statutorily defined with respect to
the UTA. And while it may be obvious to the UTA and its legal counsel that the Board
of Directors is that governing body, it is not necessarily common public knowledge that
the UTA even has a Board of Directors, let alone how to serve a notice of claim
properly upon the Board of Directors. In light of this, the UTA's express assertion that
sections 63-30-11 and -13, as enacted at the time, are "plain and unambiguous" is
disingenuous at best.
Fortunately, Utah's legislature has somewhat alleviated the previously prevailing
confusion by amending the notice of claim statutes so that the Act now states that a

15
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notice of claim "shall be directed and delivered to . . . the president or secretary of the
board, when the claim is against a special district." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)

<

(as amended in 1998). Unfortunately, the Act was not so clear when the Serratos filed
their notice of claim in this case.
1

III. The Bellonio Case Has Little Application to the Facts of this Case.
Moreover, the UTA's attempt to establish the Bellonio case as "the controlling
case with respect to the Serratos1 claims" is a bit puzzling. The facts and legal

i

arguments in that case only loosely and incompletely approximate the situation occuring
with the Serratos. See Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App.
1996). The claimant in Bellonio made no reasonable attempt to determine how to serve
Salt Lake City-the political subdivision involved in that case. Instead, the claimant
attempted simply to serve a number of individuals who may have had some connection
with the Salt Lake City airport. See kL at 1295-96. In addition, the claimant argued
"that constructive notice to the governmental entity, coupled with substantial
compliance with respect to the form of the notice, is sufficient." kL at 1296 (emphasis
added). These are not the Serratos' arguments.1

1

In fact, the continued vitality of the strict Bellonio ruling must be
questioned in light of the Supreme Court's more recent ruling in the Larson case,
where the Court validated filing a notice of claim upon someone other than the actual
governing body while relying upon Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rather
than upon any statute. See 955 P.2d at 345-46.
16
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IV. The Principles Established in Larson and Bischel Apply to the Serratos.
The Serratos instead argue that, in light of the statutes' general silence
concerning who is the UTA's governing body or how and in what manner to serve that
governing body, the Serratos' notice of claim filed with both the UTA's Risk Manager
and Claims Administrator satisfied the requirements of the statutory scheme inasmuch
as the purposes underlying the notice of claim requirement have been met and
additional factors unique to this case would appear to justify the Serratos' decision of
whom to serve with the notice.
These are precisely the same arguments that persuaded the Larson court and
Bischel court to validate actual service upon someone other than the actual governing
body of a political subdivision. Even so, the UTA has attempted to distinguish these
two cases from the Serratos' situation. Of course, in light of the factual underpinnings
unique to each of these cases, pointing out differences is not difficult. On the other
hand, the principles established in Larson and Bischel do apply to the Serratos' case,
especially when viewing all facts and inferences in the Serratos' favor, as is generally
required of an appellate court when reviewing a grant of summary judgment. See
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah App. 1989).
Certainly, Larson and Bischel suggest the type of unique factual situations that
would lead a court to validate a seemingly misfiled notice of claim, but not the only

17

situations. In any event, the Serratos' situation involves factual elements similar to
both cases!
As was the case in Larson, the Serratos filed their notice with individuals who
do enjoy a significant relationship with the UTA's Board of Directors, not from actual
physical contact with the Board, but in light of the substantial responsibilities delegated
by the Board to the UTA's Office of Risk Management for investigating, negotiating
and handling claims against the UTA. Admittedly, the UTA's Risk Manager and
Claims Administrator do not have a statutorily based relationship with the Board as
does a city recorder with a city council, cf Larson, 955 P.2d at 346; nevertheless, this
relationship within the UTA is much more closely associated with the actual claims
process than any relationship between city recorder and city council. In light of the
facts favoring the Serratos, Mr. Cain and Mr. Pitcher could be deemed agents of the
Board with respect to the claims process.
In addition, the facts favoring the Serratos indicate that someone in the UTA
office who apparently purported to have knowledge of the notice of claims process
directed one of Serratos' attorneys by telephone to file the notice with Mr. Cain.
Similarly, in Bischel, the claimant's attorney was instructed by a Salt Lake County
employee to serve the individual actually served in that case. See 907 P.2d at 278-79.
The Bischel court considered this factor extremely relevant, while commenting the
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"public deserves more consistent, more credible treatment from its servants." IcL at
279.
This factor should not be lightly disregarded as the UTA would have the Court
do. Certainly, the UTA should not be allowed to profit from its employees
disseminating misinformation concerning who is authorized to receive a notice of
claim. It is anticipated that an amicus brief will be filed in this matter by Teresa
Greene, whose attorney in another Third District Court case against the UTA (civil no.
990910753) claims to have been verbally instructed by Mr. David Pitcher to deliver the
notice of claim to him, Pitcher. The attorney, having done so, was informed more than
one month later by Pitcher, but just a few days after the one-year time period had
elapsed, that the notice of claim was improperly filed and Ms. Greene's claims were
barred.
Accordingly, when viewing the facts and inferences in favor of the Serratos,
those facts and inferences support the validation of their efforts to properly file a notice
of claim with the UTA. Just as occurred in the Larson and Bischel cases, this Court
should rule that the Serratos1 Notice of Claim was properly filed with the UTA, through
agents of the Board of Directors.
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V. Because the Serratos Timely Filed a Notice of Claim and Timely Filed Their
Complaint, Utah's Savings Statute Should Apply to Allow Refiling.
<

1

While the UTA cites a multitude of cases to dispute the Serratos analysis of
section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code, none of those cases are dispositive of the issue
involved and are cited for the dicta they contain. The one-year period may operate as a
statute of limitations to bar claims when the notice of claim is not timely served.
However, a notice of claim was served within one year after the claim arose by the
Serratos in this case. If that notice is somehow procedurally defective, section 78-1240 should operate to allow the Serratos to refile the notice of claim and to refile their
lawsuit, both of which were done in timely fashion pursuant to the applicable statutes.
Thus, the arguments made in the Serratos' initial brief are valid.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the arguments and analysis contained in the Brief of Appellant
and this Reply Brief, the Serratos respectfully request that the Court of Appeals reverse
the Trial Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the UTA and Mr.
Sargent and denying the Serratos' motion for summary judgment. In addition, the
Serratos request that the Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal be vacated and
that the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings. In the alternative,
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the Serratos request that this Court rule that they be allowed to refile the notice of claim
with the UTA and refile the Complaint in accordance with Utah's savings statute.
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of July, 2000.
BERTCH& BIRCH
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2f

day of July, 2000,1 caused to be

mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing
COMBINED REPLY BRIEF AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES to the
following:
Jody K. Burnett
Williams & Hunt
275 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
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